State-building and the Management of Diversity in India (Thirteenth to Seventeenth Centuries) by Lefèvre, Corinne
HAL Id: halshs-01955988
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01955988
Submitted on 7 Jan 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
State-building and the Management of Diversity in India
(Thirteenth to Seventeenth Centuries)
Corinne Lefèvre
To cite this version:
Corinne Lefèvre. State-building and the Management of Diversity in India (Thirteenth to Sev-
enteenth Centuries). Medieval History Journal, SAGE Publications, 2014, 16 (2), pp.425-447.
￿10.1177/0971945813514907￿. ￿halshs-01955988￿
 http://mhj.sagepub.com/
The Medieval History Journal
 http://mhj.sagepub.com/content/16/2/425
The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/0971945813514907
 2013 16: 425The Medieval History Journal
Corinne Lefèvre
to Seventeenth Centuries)
State-building and the Management of Diversity in India (Thirteenth
 
 
Published by:
 http://www.sagepublications.com
 can be found at:The Medieval History JournalAdditional services and information for 
 
 
 
 
 http://mhj.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 
 http://mhj.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 
 http://mhj.sagepub.com/content/16/2/425.refs.htmlCitations: 
 
 What is This?
 
- Mar 20, 2014Version of Record >> 
 at Maison des Science de lHomme on March 21, 2014mhj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
State-building and the Management 
of Diversity in India (Thirteenth to 
Seventeenth Centuries)
Corinne Lefe'vre*
How has political diversity—and, first of all, administrative and institutional 
diversity—been handled within the succeeding polities that prevailed in 
the Indian subcontinent from 1200 to 1700? In order to provide the non-
specialist reader with a first insight into this complex question, the present 
article opens with a presentation of the sources available for reconstructing 
the administrative organisation and functioning of medieval and early 
modern Indian polities. Despite the fragmentary and biased nature of the 
information they provide, these sources (mainly epigraphic materials and 
narrative texts) have often been elevated to the rank of a solid substratum 
that allowed for the development of highly sophisticated yet antagonistic 
analyses of both the nature and the working of the Indian state in pre-British 
times. Besides a strong focus on the question of centralisation, most of 
these analyses have also long been marred by an implicit but ever-present 
Western point of comparison. From the middle of the 1980s, however, a 
number of voices have argued in favour of an alternative approach that 
would value both the processual character of state- and institution-building 
and its ideological dimension while stressing at the same time the need 
to take into account the diversity of the forms assumed by this process in 
the various regions that came to constitute a given polity and to pay more 
attention to the wide range of actors involved in state-formation and to 
the latter’s political cultures. Taking its cue from these non-aligned or 
revisionist studies, as they are often termed, the last part of the essay shifts 
from the purely institutional perspective presiding over the first and largely 
historiographical section and proposes to examine instead the politics of 
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diversity that were theorised and implemented by pre-colonial South Asian 
dynasties as well as the way these politics were perceived and handled 
by those who bore their brunt most directly, that is to say the subordinate 
functional elites.
Just like Europe, India was not a culturally, religiously, ethnically or 
politically unified entity in the period from the thirteenth to the seventeenth 
century. In contrast to Europe, however, India presented a relatively 
homogeneous picture where overarching political institutions were 
concerned. There was, for instance, nothing like the so-called maritime 
Republics of the Italian peninsula: even the flourishing port-city of 
Calicut where Vasco da Gama landed in 1498 was at the hands of a royal 
dynasty, that of the celebrated Zamorins. Kingship, in other words, was 
everywhere the preferred supra-local political institution. Significant 
diversity was located in the extent of the territories controlled (from a city 
and its hinterland to imperial formations spanning several regions) and 
more importantly, in the nature of the relationship(s) established between 
the monarch, his agents and the localities of his dominions. Precisely this 
‘diversity from within’ is what I want to survey here, in consonance with 
the broad comparative approach lying at the root of the present volume.
How then has political diversity—and first of all administrative and 
institutional diversity—been handled within the succeeding polities 
that prevailed in the Indian subcontinent from 1200 to 1700? This is an 
especially demanding task for a number of reasons that need to be analysed 
in order to clear the ground for further reflection, but also to provide the 
readers who are not familiar with Indian history with valid insights with 
regard to the state of the art of politics.
Where Do We Speak From? A Review  
of the Available Sources
First among these reasons is the nature of the sources available for 
reconstructing the administrative organisation and functioning of medieval 
and early modern Indian polities. For, in contrast to his European colleague, 
the scholar investigating the political history of pre-colonial South Asia 
has no extensive institutional archives, such as fiscal and judicial registers, 
to rely on: except for various regions at the very end of the period under 
examination (the Deccan Sultanates in the wake of their absorption by 
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the Mughals during the second half of the seventeenth century, or the 
eighteenth-century Maratha polity for instance),1 all we have access 
to are, at best, dispersed collections of administrative documents and 
correspondence as well as revenue manuals. And this does not only hold 
true for small regional kingdoms such as the Kakatiya realm that dominated 
the Andhra country during a long thirteenth century.2 It also applies to a 
large extent to the giant Mughal Empire, which at the height of its extension 
at the end of the seventeenth century had become quasi-coterminous with 
the subcontinent. So, what types of records have the political historians of 
pre-colonial India traditionally relied upon? In answering this question, I 
will focus more particularly on three polities which, because of their trans-
regional dimensions and embedded diversity—be it cultural, religious, 
ethnical or political, will be at the core of this essay: the Delhi Sultanate, 
Vijayanagara and the Mughal Empire.
Very broadly speaking, the materials shedding light on the institutional 
arrangements and developments of these kingdoms may be said to be of 
two great types. Chronologically, the first are epigraphic materials, which, 
until the thirteenth century in the north and the fourteenth century in the 
south, constituted the largest corpus available. Whereas inscriptions have 
never loomed large in the historiography of Indo-Islamic polities, they 
have long held the high ground in the case of Vijayanagara: historians 
have relied heavily on the donations they recorded—chiefly donations to 
Brahmans, temples and other religious communities—in order to exhume 
the institutional structures of the kingdom, mainly through a tracking of 
recurrent administrative terminology. Even though the groups represented 
in the epigraphic materials included a wide range of political actors—first 
among whom were kings and subordinate warrior chiefs—and therefore 
allow a glimpse into several of Vijayanagara’s administrative features, 
contemporary inscriptions did not, however, constitute political records 
per se.
The second major type of sources that have been tapped in order 
to understand how Indian pre-colonial polities actually worked are 
narrative texts. Foremost among these are kingly sponsored chronicles 
1 For an in-depth study of Deccani administration during this period, see Richards, Mughal 
Administration; for accounts of the Maratha polity based on documents preserved in the Pune 
Daftar or the Bharat Itihas Samshodak Mandal, see inter alia Gordon, Marathas, Marauders 
and Wink, Land and Sovereignty in India.
2 On the Kakatiyas, see Talbot, Precolonial India in Practice.
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whose purport was the glorification of the regime in general and of the 
monarch who patronised the text in particular. Most chronicles of this 
kind followed a chronological framework and included information about 
the technologies of governance designed by the ruler and his entourage. 
In contrast to these texts, which were meant to be read as (but were not) 
factual accounts of events, works belonging to the genre of normative 
literature presented the reader with the ideal principles according to which 
society should be organised and governed. They were works of advice 
submitted by members of the elite to the ruling monarchs or, more rarely, 
reflections on the business of kingship composed by the rulers themselves. 
Although such narrative texts have been mostly associated with the Delhi 
Sultanate and the Mughal Empire, they are also available to the historian 
of Vijayanagara: suffice it to mention here the lengthy section on political 
ethics (raja-niti) included in the Amuktamalyada (The Woman Who Gives 
a Garland Already Worn), a major Telugu work by the famous Tuluva 
ruler Krishnadevaraya (r. 1509–1529), or the Achyutarayabhyudayam 
(The Rise of Achyutaraya), a biography of his successor Achyutaraya 
(r. 1529–1542).3
Travel accounts constitute yet another category of narrative texts that 
have extensively been used by historians to make sense of the nature and 
organisation of medieval and early modern Indian polities, all the more 
so because the authors of these travelogues made a point of offering their 
audience a clear and comprehensive account of the political customs 
of such exotic kingdoms. In this respect, one should keep in mind the 
historiographical importance acquired by such texts as the fourteenth-
century account of the Moroccan Ibn Battuta on the Delhi Sultanate, the 
sixteenth-century descriptions of Vijayanagara by the Portuguese Domingo 
Paes and Fernão Nunes or the report by the French François Bernier on 
late seventeenth-century Mughal India. The latter is a particular case in 
point. As a matter of fact, Bernier’s characterisation of the empire founded 
by Babur (r. 1526–1530) as a highly predatory state that denied property 
rights to its denizens and left the peasantry with barely enough to survive 
was to become tremendously influential in the writings of colonial and 
post-colonial historians such as William H. Moreland and Irfan Habib.4
3 For a recent re-examination and translation of the Amuktamalyada’s Niti section, see 
Narayana Rao, Shulman and Subrahmanyam, ‘A New Imperial Idiom in the Sixteenth 
Century’.
4 For a demonstration of this point, see Alam and Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction’.
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What comes out clearly from this, admittedly, cursory review of the 
sources generally summoned for the study of pre-colonial South Asian 
polities is the fragmentary and biased nature of the information they 
provide where actual political functioning is concerned. Paradoxically, 
however, these same sources have been elevated by many to the rank of a 
solid substratum that allowed for the development of highly sophisticated 
yet antagonistic analyses of both the nature and the working of the Indian 
state in pre-British times. These historiographical developments, it will 
be argued in the following pages, are another reason why thinking about 
politico-institutional diversity and its management stands today as a 
challenging task for the historian of South Asia.
The Question of Politico-institutional Diversity in the 
Historiography of Indian Pre-colonial States
When envisioned from the perspective of political institutions, the task 
allotted to me by the editors of the present volume, the question of the 
handling of diversity in a given polity may be said to boil down to that 
of the degree of centralisation and unification achieved by that same 
polity. In other words, to what extent, if at all, were the monarch and his 
agents able to effectively control all the territories that had come under 
their domination and to impose a uniform pattern of administration over 
these territories? The answers given to this question by many historians 
resulted in the emergence of an enduring dividing line between two 
groups whose constituents shared, however, little else than an implicit 
common understanding of the administrative and fiscal reach of the Indian 
pre-colonial kingdoms. In addition, this understanding has, more often 
than not, been marred to no small extent by an implicit but ever-present 
Western point of comparison: the modern European state, especially its 
regional incarnation as the British Raj, has long constituted the horizon 
against which the history of medieval and early modern South Asian 
polities has been (wilfully or not) thought and constructed. A number of 
scholars even went as far as to argue that the subcontinent had housed 
no state to speak of before the nineteenth century—an extreme position 
provocatively alluded to in a recent essay on the subject.5
5 Kolff, ‘A Millennium of Stateless Indian History?’
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Overcoming Politico-institutional Diversity: The Travails  
of the Centralising State
On one side of the historiographical demarcation line mentioned above, 
one may identify a first group of scholars who ascribed to the states 
under review a degree of centralisation high enough to have resulted in 
the effective eradication of internal administrative diversity. Following 
the typology proposed by Hermann Kulke in the introductory section of 
his edited volume on The State in India,6 one might include in this first 
group proponents of two models which, beyond their differences, bore 
the heavy stamp of colonial scholarship: on the one hand, the ‘Indian 
historiographical model’ (also variously designated as ‘imperial’ or 
‘bureaucratic’)—of which the publications of K.A. Nilakantha Sastri on 
South India or the works of several historians of Allahabad University 
like Beni Prasad provide good examples;7 and, on the other, the Marxist 
model of oriental despotism and of the Asiatic mode of production. The 
handling of the Mughal case at the hands of the so-called Aligarh school 
of Marxist inspiration is certainly the best example of this second line of 
interpretation as far as the sophistication and the enduring character of the 
argument is concerned.8 According to its best-known representative Irfan 
Habib, the Mughal state succeeded in creating and promoting a series of 
systems which uniformly applied to all imperial territories from the end 
of the sixteenth century onwards:9 first, a pervasive fiscal system centred 
on the rigorous measurement of land and collection of agrarian revenue, 
and generally known as the zabt system, a Persian word referring to the 
act of seizing; second, a monetary system based on a gold–silver–copper 
trimetallism (the silver rupiya being supported by the gold muhr and 
the copper dam); third, a hierarchical system regulating the relations 
6 Kulke, ‘Introduction’. For another survey putting in perspective the historiographies of 
the pre-colonial states of South and Southeast Asia, see Ali, ‘Connected Histories?’.
7 See e.g. Sastri, The Colas on the eponymous dynasty who dominated South-Eastern 
India from the ninth to the end of the thirteenth-century, and Prasad, History of Jahangir 
for an analysis of the Mughal Empire during the first quarter of the seventeenth century. 
Prasad, A Few Suggestions is also especially significant of the close relationship between 
the historian’s treatment of the Mughals and his reflections on the institutional future of 
post-independence India.
8 The following presentation takes its cue from Subrahmanyam, ‘The Mughal State’, and 
Alam and Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction’.
9 Among his many writings, see his magnum opus: Habib, The Agrarian System.
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between the emperor and the members of the military-administrative elite 
collectively called mansabdars or ‘those who hold a rank’; and fourth, 
a revenue assignment system that provided for the remuneration of the 
mansabdars by conferring upon them jagirs, that is to say temporary 
fiscal rights over a specified territory. Among other things, such a vision 
of the Mughal state implied that locally rooted chieftains better known 
as zamindars had been successfully deprived of their erstwhile political 
agency, leaving the peasantry face to face with the king’s men.
Despite the fact that the historiographical models reviewed so far 
were underpinned by widely different ideological premises and conveyed 
contrasting views on state centralisation (a step towards modernity for 
the former, an instrument of increased oppression for the latter), the 
partisans of both approaches shared a common belief in the strong—if 
not absolute—nature of the power exercised by pre-colonial Indian 
rulers. The latter were, moreover, seen as having successfully equipped 
themselves with an efficient and hierarchically organised administration 
enabling them to secure vast revenues through the wide-scale collection 
of agrarian surplus.
Tales of Failed Unifications: Feudal and Segmentary States
On the other side of the historiographical dividing line delineated above 
were a number of scholars who considered that the administrative 
authority of the king and of his agents did not extend beyond the core 
territories surrounding the capital while the bulk of the kingdom remained 
in the hands of highly autonomous warlords whose relation with the 
centre ranged, according to formulations, from the regular payment 
of a tribute to the mere acknowledgement of the ritual sovereignty of 
the monarch. Relying once more on the typology elaborated by Kulke, 
such a vision of Indian pre-colonial states as having failed to achieve a 
high degree of political integration may be said to have been shared by 
the advocates of the Marxist-influenced model of Indian feudalism,10 
the proponents of the segmentary state model that was originally 
10 Chapters 9 and 10 of ‘Feudalism from Above’and ‘Feudalism from Below’ of Kosambi, 
An Introduction constituted the first attempt to define Indian feudalism; a decade later, 
Sharma, Indian Feudalism became the reference work on the subject. For an overview of 
the historiographical debate that ensued from these publications, see Byres and Mukhia, 
Feudalism and Non-European Societies.
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developed by the anthropologist Aidan Southall in relation to the Alur 
society of eastern Africa and,11 to a lesser degree, by the adherents of 
the Weberian ‘patrimonial-bureaucratic state’ model.12 Among all these 
formulations, the segmentary state was certainly the one that carried 
the idea of decentralisation the furthest as vividly shown, in particular, 
by Burton Stein’s analysis of Vijayanagara in his Peasant State and 
Society in Medieval South India published in 1980. According to David 
Shulman who aptly summarized Stein’s reflections on the subject, the 
main features of the segmentary state were as follows:
a) a relatively weak centre whose control diminishes consistently 
with distance, so that one finds a series of relatively autonomous 
peripheral centres; 
b) a tendency for these peripheral centres to ‘replicate’ the structure 
of authority evident in the major centre; 
c) a pyramid-like organisation of the socio-political segments in 
relation to the central authority [...];
d) a ritual or symbolic hegemony that replaces effective political 
control as a major integrating force in the polity; 
e) a dynamic, shifting, fluctuating system of relations between the 
various segments, the more peripheral of which can easily switch 
their allegiance.13 
Burton Stein’s assimilation of Vijayanagara to the segmentary 
state model represents, it is true, only one moment of his constantly 
evolving reflection on that polity,14 and its importance should therefore 
not be overemphasised. Still, the characterisation of Vijayanagara as a 
kingdom where local territories were not administrative regions nor local 
administrators bureaucratic agents emanating from the centre and where 
11 See Southall, Alur Society for the original formulation, and Southall, ‘The Segmentary 
State in Africa and Asia’ for its later extension to South Asia.
12 Weber’s influence is most vividly felt in Blake, Shahjahanabad where the Mughal 
Empire is credited with a strong patrimonial administration at the centre which, however, 
extended only temporarily beyond the core area through increased military and administrative 
control. As a whole, then, Blake’s Mughal state lacked political integration and had to fight 
ubiquitous centrifugal tendencies.
13 Shulman, The King and the Clown: 18–19.
14 See Subrahmanyam, ‘Agreeing to Disagree’.
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fiscal flows between the regions and the centre were, at best, episodic 
gives to the readers unfamiliar with Indian history a better idea of the 
very wide range of external models that have been applied to South Asian 
pre-colonial polities.
Be it as it may, on both sides of the historiographical demarcation line, 
the management of administrative diversity tended to become a somewhat 
irrelevant question because such diversity was either considered to have 
been successfully erased in the years following the foundation of the new 
polity or, on the contrary, was thought to constitute a permanent feature 
the monarch was powerless to overcome.
Taking a Kaleidoscopic View of South Asian Pre-colonial Polities
From the middle of 1980s, however, a number of voices have risen against 
such monolithic and often structuralist understandings of South Asian 
polities, arguing instead in favour of an approach that would value both the 
processual character of state- and institution-building and its ideological 
dimension. Besides, these non-aligned or revisionist studies, as they are 
often termed, have stressed the need to take into account the diversity 
of the forms assumed by this process in the various regions that came to 
constitute a given polity and to pay more attention to the wide range of 
actors involved in state-formation and to the latter’s political cultures. 
In the case of the Delhi Sultanate, Sunil Kumar has demonstrated, for 
instance, how politico-administrative integration actually proceeded in fits 
and starts—both at spatial and chronological levels—rather than linearly.15 
Whereas the penetration of the Delhi Sultanate at a local level had long 
been associated with the administrative, fiscal and monetary reforms 
Ala-ud-din Khalji (r. 1296–1316) introduced circa 1300, Kumar—basing 
himself on a wider range of sources than those traditionally used (including 
Sufi literature, numismatic, epigraphic and architectural materials) as well 
as on a reading against the grain of official chronicles—relates it instead 
to the three decades that followed the death of Shams-ud-din Iltutmish 
15 The following development is based on Kumar, The Emergence of the Delhi Sultanate. 
For other examples of such an approach, see: Chattopadhyaya, The Making of Early Medieval 
India on early medieval Rajput political formations; Kulke, Kings and Cults for a sample of 
his contributions on the Gajapatis of Orissa; Alam, The Crisis of Empire, and Singh, Region 
and Empire on the Mughal case. 
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(r. 1210–36) in 1236. Significantly enough, these years were one of the 
most troubled periods of the history of the sultanate: they witnessed both a 
dramatic contraction of the regions controlled by the sultan and incessant 
power conflicts between Iltutmish’s now virtually autonomous military 
slaves or bandagan (singular, banda). In order to withstand the challenge 
of their fellow competitors and of sultanate forces, these Shamsi bandagan 
strove to establish deeper roots in the core territories of the sultanate they 
had come to control, most notably through alliances with local chieftains 
(or Ranas) and their subordinates. And according to Kumar, it is precisely 
in these Shamsis’ efforts to implicate their territories into the politics and 
economy of their local contexts that the origins of the sultanate’s penetration 
into the countryside are to be located: for the Shamsis’ entrenchment not 
only took them to regions where the sultanate armies had never been 
before; once a measure of central authority was restored under Balban 
(r. 1266–1287), the necessity to neutralize the entrenched Shamsis also 
imposed that the chieftains with whom they had allied be destroyed or 
displaced and that direct sultanate administration be established on those 
territories.
This last example brings to light the benefits of considering the question 
of the handling of politico-institutional diversity from the point of view 
of the widest possible range of historical agents. Let the reader not be 
misled: this is not an attempt to examine state-building from below—an 
approach that has recently been promoted by a number of historians of 
Europe.16 Whatever the benefits of a perspective from below, the available 
materials on pre-colonial South Asia simply deny such a possibility to 
the scholar: it is indeed no accident that the Subaltern Studies Collective 
failed to leave its mark on the medieval and early modern (political) history 
of India.17 Despite these limitations, the socio-cultural lead is the one I 
will follow in the second part of this essay, shifting as a result from the 
purely institutional perspective that has presided over the first and largely 
historiographical section. For, although technologies of governance are an 
important subject of study in themselves, one should keep in mind that they 
did not exist in abstracta but were elaborated, conveyed and implemented 
by—and therefore, at least originally, linked to—specific communities 
16 See the contributions gathered in Blockmans, Holenstein and Mathieu, Empowering 
Interactions.
17 For two isolated forays, see, however, Bhadra, ‘Two Frontier Uprisings in Mughal 
India’; and Mayaram, Against History, Against State.
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or groups who shared what may be called a common political culture. In 
that sense, the examination of the management of politico-institutional 
diversity should not be disconnected from that of the handling of the 
different groups carrying these various political traditions with them. 
Here is, in other words, how one could reformulate the question raised 
by the editors of the present volume: what were the politics of diversity 
that were theorised and implemented by South Asian dynasties between 
the thirteenth and the seventeenth century? And how were these politics 
perceived and handled by those who bore their brunt most directly, that 
is to say the subordinate functional elites?18
Politics of Diversity: The Royal Prism
Let us start, then, by reviewing two very different types of royal 
attitudes vis-à-vis the diversity of populations and political cultures 
that pre-colonial South Asian kingdoms came to encompass in the 
process of their construction and expansion.
Case 1: Cultivating Diversity
A first set of attitudes can be subsumed under the caption of ‘cultivating 
diversity’ and may be considered the most common handling pattern 
amongst the transregional polities under review. Whereas this has long 
been recognised to be the case of the Mughal Empire and of the Delhi 
Sultanate’s offshoots in Bengal and in the Deccan, it is only quite recently 
that Vijayanagara has come to be seen in this light, and it is therefore this 
particular polity that will be used here as a case study.
As hinted above, Vijayanagara has long been considered a kingdom 
cultivating uniformity and singularity with regard to both ideology and 
political practices: it has been described as an essentially Hindu state whose 
very foundation and increasing militaristic orientation were spurred by the 
need to preserve the Hindu political and cultural order in the South against the 
expansion of Islam in the region which the troops of the Delhi, Bahmani and 
then the fragmented Deccan Sultanates successively incarnated. While it is 
true that the rulers of Vijayanagara sought to portray themselves as dharmic 
18 Even if religious actors—be they temples, monasteries, priests, ulama or leaders of 
Sufi movements—played no small part in the shaping and implementation of South Asian 
politics of diversity, the focus will be here on military and administrative elites.
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kings (protecting the traditional socio-religious order), sponsored Brahmins 
and associated with a number of deities (most notably Virupaksha, a form 
of Shiva, and Rama, the seventh incarnation of Vishnu), a variety of recent 
studies have shown that the constant interaction with the Islamic world—
both within the subcontinent and beyond—did not result in the rejection of 
the alterity it represented but, on the contrary, in the selective adoption of 
some of its features. Most interestingly for the present perspective, such a 
process of appropriation concerned primarily the secular political sphere 
where it operated at both a practical and symbolic level.19 
In the first domain, best known examples include the recruitment, from 
the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, of a considerable number of 
Turkic mercenaries who had previously been employed by the Deccan 
sultans and whose combined expertise in cavalry and archery techniques 
were highly valued in the context of the ongoing modernisation of the 
Vijayanagara army. Even if it is a more debated issue, the awarding of 
nayamkara tenures to Nayakas (a title referring to military leaders who also 
often discharged civilian functions) may additionally have been modelled 
on the Islamicate system of administration through iqta‘ (assignment of 
the right to collect land revenue in return for military service) which was 
introduced in India by the Delhi Sultanate.20 In the symbolic domain, the 
research conducted on Vijayanagara’s material culture by scholars such as 
Phillip Wagoner and George Michell has emphasised that the kingdom’s 
rulers and elites not only came to master the Islamicate political and 
cultural idiom to a high degree but also made a sophisticated use of it.21 
This is most vividly seen in titling practices—the Vijayanagara emperors 
adopted the title of Hindu-raya-suratrana or ‘Sultan among Hindu kings’ 
as early as 1352—as well as in the areas of architecture and clothing.
Thus, whereas religious structures (including mosques) were 
systematically built according to Indic traditional styles, buildings 
housing court rituals or used for administrative purposes bore the 
stamp—both in their structure and decoration—of Islamic architecture. 
A similar dichotomy may also be detected in the sphere of sartorial codes: 
19 The following development is based on Wagoner, ‘Harihara, Bukka, and the Sultan’: 
314–18.
20 For further details on these two related points, see ibid.; Wagoner, ‘Fortuitous 
Convergences’; and Eaton, ‘The Articulation of Islamic Space’: 160–66.
21 See e.g. Wagoner, ‘Sultan among Hindu Kings’; Michell, The Vijayanagara Courtly 
Style.
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Vijayanagara’s monarchs and courtiers wore traditional South Indian garb 
when engaged in a Hindu religious activity or in a domestic setting, but 
opted for an Islamic style of dress for formal public audiences. As rightly 
argued by Wagoner, the fact that the use of the Islamic politico-cultural 
idiom was essentially public and restricted to secular and courtly settings 
points to its adoption by the local Indic elite as ‘a means of effecting their 
symbolic participation in the more universal culture of Islam, thereby 
enhancing their political status and credibility in the eyes of the other 
participants in the Islamicate cultural system’.22 
The simultaneous cultivation of Indic and Islamic languages and 
technologies of power by the rulers of Vijayanagara is certainly a point 
that deserves the attention it has received in recent years. It should not, 
however, obscure the existence of other levels of diversity within the 
polity: what about, for instance, the management of the various regional 
and linguistic communities—Telugu, Kannada and Tamil—composing 
the local elite? Inscriptions have provided valuable prosopographical 
data on the personnel active in, say, the Tamil or the Andhra country, but 
additional research needs to be done about the more general pattern of 
incorporation that lay behind these postings and its possible ideological 
underpinnings.23 The same holds true for the articulation by the functional 
elites of their regional affiliation with their newly acquired imperial 
identity: if Krishnadevaraya’s self-presentation in the Amuktamalyada as 
a Kannada monarch dedicating his book to a Telugu god-cum-king is any 
indication,24 such articulations were fraught with tensions.
Case 2: Promoting Uniformity
The second case study takes the reader to the Delhi Sultanate and to 
an altogether different type of royal attitudes towards diversity. The 
Persian literati writing for the successive sultans have done their best to 
bequeath to posterity an image of these men as outstanding commanders 
of a unified Muslim community struggling against the assaults of the 
22 Wagoner, ‘Harihara, Bukka, and the Sultan’: 316.
23 On Tamil Nadu, compare Karashima, Towards a New Formation with Narayana Rao, 
Shulman and Subrahmanyam, Symbols of Substance: especially chapter 2; for the Andhra 
country, see Talbot, ‘The Nāyakas of Vijayanagara Andhra’.
24 Narayana Rao, Shulman and Subrahmanyam, ‘A New Imperial Idiom in the Sixteenth 
Century’. For a recent, epigraphically based attempt to explore Nayaka political subjectivity 
under the rubric of kinship, see Chekuri, ‘“Fathers” and “Sons”’. 
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Mongol invaders (the outside enemy) and striving to extend the frontiers 
of the Dar-ul-Islam at the expense of the Hindu kafirs (or infidels, the 
enemy from within). Although it has been convincingly argued that such 
a characterisation deserved to be nuanced to a considerable extent,25 
it cannot be ascribed solely to the polishing effect of the chroniclers’ 
qalam. The violence assumed by the management of diversity in the 
sultanate—particularly during its initial phase—can in fact hardly be 
denied, especially in comparison with the Vijayanagara case discussed 
above or with the methods of acculturation douce (most notably through 
Persianisation) later favoured by the Mughals. The reference here is not 
to military campaigns but to the central role played by military slavery 
in the formation of the sultanate’s elite corps.26
As is well-known, Muizz-ud-din Ghuri’s (r. 1173–1206) North Indian 
campaigns and their consolidation under his commanders in the last decade 
of the twelfth century marked the advent of these mamluks or bandagan, as 
they were called in Persian, on the regional political stage as subordinates 
of the sultans but also, for the better part of the thirteenth century, as 
sultans themselves. These bandagan were typically non-Muslims who 
entered the service of the sultan as young boys either through purchase or 
as part of the booty acquired during military operations. Once the property 
of the sultan, they received an intensive military training as well as an 
introduction to the Islamic creed and to the social rules governing life at 
court—all of which were meant to turn them into loyal servants devoted 
to their new master’s interests and creed or, in other words, to impart a 
brand new identity upon them. The bandagan were indeed expected to 
cut off all ties with the society they hailed from: the distant Central Asian 
steppe in the case of Mongols and Turks who constituted the majority of 
this slave elite, or closer local and regional polities for those who, like 
the famous Malik Kafur,27 were of Indian extraction. While nowadays it 
is generally accepted that such deracinated elites never entirely severed 
the bonds of solidarity with their native homes and erstwhile networks, it 
nonetheless remains true that the logic presiding over their incorporation 
25 Kumar, The Emergence of the Delhi Sultanate, especially Chapter 4.
26 For a panoramic view of the role of slavery in South Asian history, see the contributions 
gathered in Chatterjee and Eaton, Slavery and South Asian History.
27 Malik Kafur (d. 1316) was part of the large booty captured from Cambay in the wake 
of the Khalji conquest of Gujarat in 1299. As a eunuch slave of ‘Ala’-ud-din Khalji, he 
became one of the leading military commanders of the sultanate.
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into the sultanate was one that aimed at erasing their original ethnic and 
religious diversity in order to promote the new rising ‘Persianate Muslim 
order’. Interestingly enough, such a drive towards uniformity did not only 
concern the slave elements of the Sultanate’s ruling class; it also affected, 
albeit at a very different level, the free commanders whose political culture 
did not conform to the officially-sponsored idiom.
As argued by Sunil Kumar, this was particularly the case of those 
frontier commanders who had a record of past service to the Mongols, 
the archenemy of the sultanate.28 Most famous amongst them were, rather 
ironically, Jalal-ud-din Khalji (r. 1290–1296) and Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq 
(r. 1320–1324), founders of the respective Khalji and Tughluq dynasties: 
whereas the former had served as the Mongol commander of Binban (west 
of the Indus), the latter was a Qara’una Turk, a group closely associated 
with the Juchid-Golden Horde. Once at the head of the sultanate, these men 
introduced into its apparatus new administrative practices and rituals such 
as the ulagh postal relay system of Mongol origins, and the Turkic ghashiya 
royal ritual of procession. The steppe provenance of these innovations could, 
however, hardly be mentioned as such in official chronicles that purported 
to describe the sultans’ implementation of Persian norms of governance and 
narrate their triumphs over the evil forces of the Mongols. In the case of the 
frontier commanders, then, it was the memory of the alternative traditions 
they represented and introduced in the sultanate, rather than the traditions 
themselves, which was the object of obliteration. Promoting uniformity 
was, to be sure, a common purpose of royal historiography which, in the 
case of the Delhi Sultanate, combined most effectively with homogenising 
administrative practices such as military slavery. This does not mean, of 
course, that diversity was thereby successfully eradicated—far from it; 
it simply complicated the task of twenty-first-century historians eager to 
recover it. Be that as it may, the Delhi Sultanate case unmistakably points 
to a very different pattern of handling diversity than the one promoted by 
Vijayanagara rayas and Mughal padshahs.
Politics of Diversity: Elites’ Ways of Talking Back
In the concluding section of this essay, I propose to cast the net wider and 
to move the focus away from the head managers of political diversity—the 
kings and their closest associates—onto those whose alterity was thereby 
28 The following development is based on Kumar, ‘The Ignored Elites’.
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handled, that is to say the subordinate elites. What were, in other words, 
the reactions of the functional elites to dynastic politics of diversity? 
Multiple ways of talking back were available to them, ranging from 
rejection to assimilation and including partial accommodation. These 
responses were, moreover, not frozen in time but evolved according 
to the fluctuations of the balance of power and of official ideology. 
Thanks to the relatively copious sub-imperial literature that has reached 
us, the reactions of the different groups that came to be included under 
the Mughal umbrella are certainly amongst the best known today and 
they will therefore constitute the focus of the following discussion on 
the subject. The Turco-Mongol and Rajput instances chosen for case 
study present the advantage of documenting the responses of members 
of the ‘old’ nobility—a term referring to the elite groups who arrived 
in India alongside with the Mughals—and of some of the new elements 
that were associated with the dynasty in the course of the expansion 
and consolidation of its power.29 Besides, these examples allow us to 
scrutinise two very different brands of political cultures the Mughals 
had to confront when building their empire.
Case 1: Marginalisation and Rebellion
The first brand considered here is the Turco-Mongol one. The Mughals 
being themselves of Central Asian origin, warriors and lords of the same 
background naturally held prime of place in the entourage of Babur, of 
his son Humayun (r. 1530–40, 1555–56), and of his grandson Akbar 
(r. 1556–1605) on the latter’s accession to the throne. The primacy of 
the Turanis (the preferred designation of people hailing from Central 
Asia in Mughal sources) was not, however, without causing problems to 
the emperors in so far as the dominant political culture among this group 
valued a conception of collective sovereignty originating with Chingiz Khan 
(d. 1227) according to which the right to rule belonged to the lineage as a 
whole rather than to the individual figure of the monarch.30 Even though this 
Turco-Mongol tradition had been substantially altered by Timur (d. 1405) 
29 It also holds true of the Iranian and Afghan components of the Mughal elite, which are 
analysed in a similar perspective in Lefèvre, ‘Pouvoir et noblesse dans l’empire moghol’.
30 For two classical, albeit contrasted, accounts of the Turco-Mongol political tradition and 
its impact on early Mughal and Sur Northern India, see Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim 
Administration: 105–21, and Khan, ‘The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship’.
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at the benefit of the ruler’s authority, it was still thought of by his Mughal 
descendants as conducive to political fragmentation and, therefore, as an 
impediment to the strong central authority they wished to develop in their 
new dominions. This had indeed been bitterly experienced by Humayun 
whose failure to take up the challenge emanating from his nobility and 
siblings (especially his half-brother Mirza Kamran) resulted in the loss of 
his Indian possessions to the Afghan Sur dynasty for more than a decade.
Given his father’s setbacks, one of Akbar’s most pressing needs was 
to tighten his grip over the military-administrative elite, an objective he 
strove to achieve through the development of a three-pronged strategy: one 
aspect thereof was the diversification of the groups on which the dynasty 
had so far relied on for maintenance of order, and this implied the growing 
participation in the empire of Iranians, Indian Muslims or shaikhzadas as 
well as local Rajput chiefs and scribal elites such as Kayasthas and Khatris; 
another was the elaboration of a series of administrative instruments 
that were to ensure the transformation of this highly heterogeneous elite 
into a strictly hierarchised body of loyal servants to the empire; finally, 
the ideological formulations Akbar successively elaborated aimed at 
tightening the bonds between the monarch and his umara’ (singular amir, 
a high-ranking dignitary) and at strengthening the latter’s adhesion to the 
empire. The Central Asian elements of the nobility particularly resented 
the first two aspects of Akbar’s strategy: while the emperor’s cultivation 
of diversity threatened to undermine their erstwhile dominant position in 
the political arena, his development of administrative practices of control 
ran counter to the relative autonomy they were accustomed to. Unwilling 
to endorse the new orientations promoted by Akbar, different sections of 
this Central Asian elite launched far-reaching revolts in 1564–66 and again 
in 1580–82:31 in both cases, the rebels enlisted the support of Akbar’s 
half-brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim (d. 1585) in whom they saw the 
rightful guardian of the Turco-Mongol political traditions they valued so 
much.32 Their protest movements, however, failed to succeed, and the 
Turani umara’ had no choice but to accept the diminished position they 
had been assigned in the new order. 
31 For a brief account of both events, see Richards, The Mughal Empire: 16–18 and 
40–41.
32 This has been argued previously by Subrahmanyam, ‘The Mughal State’: 298–99. For 
further details on the figure of Mirza Muhammad Hakim, see Subrahmanyam, ‘A Note on 
the Kabul Kingdom’; and Faruqui, ‘The Forgotten Prince’.
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And yet, this did not mean that the alternative political culture they 
represented disappeared completely: projects of appanaging the empire 
between contending princes resurfaced regularly during the seventeenth 
century and the early eighteenth on occasion of princely rebellions and 
succession struggles. It has, for instance, been shown to be the case 
in the late 1650s (between Aurangzeb and his brother Murad) and, 
again, after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707 (between Bahadur Shah and his 
brother A‘zam Shah).33 The relatively late date of both events should 
not, however, lead one to reduce the latter to some kind of signal of the 
crumbling fortunes of the empire. As a matter of fact, in 1606—that is, 
only a year after the demise of Akbar who has long been credited with 
the eradication of the Turco-Mongol menace, his grandson Khusrau 
(d. 1622) rebelled against his reigning father Jahangir (r. 1605–27) with 
the idea of appropriating the ancient dominions of Mirza Muhammad 
Hakim in Kabul.34 Taken as a whole, these episodes clearly point to the 
resilience of Turco-Mongol political traditions (with their potentially 
disruptive effects on the empire) throughout the history of the dynasty. 
More generally, the handling of the Turani umara’ at the hands of Babur 
and his successors is particularly instructive where the limits of the 
Mughal politics of diversity are concerned: cultivating difference within 
the ruling class obviously did not translate into equality of treatment 
for all its components.
Case 2: Submission and Accommodation
Whereas the Central Asian example has allowed the readers to apprehend 
the reaction of an old elite group who was rather adversely affected 
by the Mughal politics of diversity, the second case study takes them 
to the opposite side of the spectrum by considering the instance of the 
Rajputs. In contrast to the Turani umara’, local Rajput warlords could 
claim no long-standing association with the Mughal rulers or a common 
politico-cultural background: initially at least, they were the local enemy 
who had to either be entreated into a subordinate association or else be 
crushed. From the 1560s onwards, most Rajput chieftains favoured the 
former solution, a substantial number of them moreover striking marital 
33 Subrahmanyam, ‘The Mughal State’: 300.
34 This is borne out by several contemporary sources including Harawi, Tarikh-i Khan 
Jahani, vol. 2: 674, 684; and Jahangir, Jahangir Nama: 51, 56 and 84.
 at Maison des Science de lHomme on March 21, 2014mhj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
State-building and the Management of Diversity  443
The Medieval History Journal, 16, 2 (2013): 425–447 
alliances with the new ruling dynasty.35 In exchange for their submission, 
the Rajas recovered their ancestral holdings in the form of watan 
jagirs—over which, it should be emphasised, they retained a fair degree 
of administrative autonomy, including the collection of land revenue. The 
Rajputs were also progressively associated with the governance of the 
empire through the attribution of military and administrative charges in 
far-off provinces. For the many among them who did not rank high in the 
traditional hierarchy of Rajput little kingdoms, the subordinate alliance 
with the Mughals hence turned out to be a formidable springboard, 
endowing them with a greater amount of legitimacy vis-à-vis subordinate 
and rival clans and allowing them to reach far higher levels of wealth 
and power than those they could formerly have laid claim to. To mention 
but a few of the best-known examples in this domain: the Kachhwaha 
Raja Bharmal’s (r. 1543–1573/74) hold over the Amber kingdom 
remained tenuous until his alliance with Akbar (1562) enabled him to 
secure his territories more firmly; the Hada Rao Surjan (d. 1585) was 
a mere subordinate to the Sisodiyas of Mewar until he surrendered the 
Ranthambhor fort to the Mughals in 1569; the Bundela Bir Singh Deo 
(r. 1605–1627), for his part, owed his accession to the throne of Orchha 
to Jahangir’s backing—the latter a reward for the murder of Abu’l Fazl, 
Akbar’s celebrated ideologue and friend. The Rajputs’ active participation 
in the new Mughal order did not, however, require them to turn their 
back on their own political culture. True, on the one hand, they abided, 
as mansabdars, by the rules of imperial service which also happened to 
find a profound echo in their own warrior ethos.36 On the other hand, 
the higher position they gained under Mughal rule allowed them to 
rise above these local codes of behaviour and to present themselves as 
fully-fledged Rajas through the adoption of a series of lordly practices. 
Whether it be the conspicuous patronage of religious centres like Varanasi 
or Mathura, the commissioning of texts belonging to the mahakavya or 
courtly epic genre, or the sponsorship of architecture and of visual arts, 
such practices conspicuously point to the persistent centrality of Indic 
norms of royalty in the Rajputs’ self-definition as Rajas.37 As has been 
demonstrated by a recent set of publications examining the literary 
35 For an exhaustive list of Mughal-Rajput marriages, see Taft, ‘Honor and Alliance’.
36 Ziegler, ‘Some Notes’.
37 This is argued in greater details in Talbot, ‘Justifying Defeat’.
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works (in Sanskrit or in vernaculars) and the buildings patronised by the 
Hadas of Bundi, the Kachhwahas of Amber and the Bundelas of Orchha, 
Mughal paramountcy only played a minimal—if not accidental—role in 
the construction of the Rajas’ legitimacy which the authors consistently 
formulated within the classical Sanskritic episteme of Hindu dharma and 
kingship.38 Furthermore, Mughal rulers were themselves incorporated 
in this episteme to a certain extent: in the texts composed at the behest 
of their subordinate allies, the padshahs were alternatively defined as 
chakravartins or ‘turners of the wheel’, described as having descended 
to earth as avataras, praised for their concern with dharma or compared 
to paragon figures of Indic royalty such as Rama. When seen from the 
Rajputs’ perspective, then, the irruption of political diversity in the guise 
of the Mughals was handled through a double process of accommodation 
to the new order and of assimilation of its foremost representatives into 
an Indic Weltanschauung—an assimilation, or ‘Hinduization’, which was, 
however, only made possible by a shared conception of the monarch as 
a divinely sanctioned figure whose prime duty was to strike a durable 
balance between the different components of society.
As the Central Asian and Rajput examples clearly illustrate, the most 
disruptive effects of newly state-sponsored politics of diversity were not 
always located where one would have expected them to be. And this 
should certainly encourage scholars working on South Asian pre-colonial 
polities to diversify the vantage points from which the complex question 
of the management of political diversity has so far been considered: 
attention must certainly continue to be paid to the solutions favoured by 
the centre and to their evolution in time, but historical analysis should 
also seriously take into account the politico-cultural responses elaborated 
by the various warrior and scribal service groups who constituted the 
backbone of Indian kingdoms and empires from the thirteenth to the 
seventeenth centuries.39
38 See ibid. on Rao Surjan Hada; Asher, ‘The Architecture of Raja Man Singh’ and Busch, 
‘Portrait of a Raja’ on Raja Man Singh Kachhwaha (d. 1614); Busch, ‘Literary Responses’; 
Pauwels, ‘The Saint, the Warlord, and the Emperor’ and Rothfarb, Orchha and Beyond on 
the Bundelas.
39 Scribal groups have recently been the object of increased scholarly attention as illustrated 
by O’Hanlon and Washbrook, Munshis, Pandits and Record Keepers, a volume dedicated 
to the exploration of the scribes’ social identities, group histories and role in a wide range 
of pre-colonial Indian polities.
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